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Abstract
Congestion has become a problem for many airports throughout the
world. Two diﬀerent policy options to control congestion are analyzed
in this paper: slot constraints and congestion pricing. In particular,
our model takes into account that the airline industry is characterized
by signiﬁcant demand uncertainty. Furthermore, due to the network
character of the airline industry, the demand for airport capacities
normally is complementary. We show that this favors the use of slot
constraints compared to congestion pricing from a social point of view.
In contrast, for monopolistic airports, prices as instruments constitute
a dominant choice.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D42, L93.
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Compared to other transport modes, air transport has realized the most
impressive growth in the last decades. However, this went not along with
a respective growth in airport capacity. As a consequence, congestion of
airports has become a relevant problem because of delays which are costly for
airlines, passengers, and the environment. Since air traﬃc forecasts show that
growth will continue to be high during the next years, congestion problems
are expected to increase in the future.
In order to control airport congestion the most overloaded airports outside
the U.S. are slot constrained. An airline that wishes to incorporate a slot
constrained airport into its networks needs to have a respective permission
(slot) to use that airport at a speciﬁed time. Because the number of slots is
constrained, airline operations at the airport are limited and, consequently,
demand and congestion can eﬀectively be controlled and optimized. There
is, however, another possibility to reduce congestion. An increase of take oﬀ
and landing fees can reduce slot demand until the optimal level of congestion
is reached. Under certain conditions, these two diﬀerent ways to deal with
congestion can always generate the optimal result from a social point of
view. However, this requires that airport slots are allocated eﬃciently among
airlines and that the regulator has perfect information about the beneﬁts and
costs of take oﬀ and landing operations. Both of these premises are normally
not fulﬁlled in reality.
At present airport slots are basically allocated by grandfather rights or,
in other words, by history. This guarantees continuity of airline operations
because airlines are allowed to constantly regain slots which they have used
in the past. On the other hand, allocation based on grandfather rights does
not account for the willingness to pay of airlines and, therefore, hampers al-
2locative eﬃciency. Additionally, regulators are not perfectly informed about
the social beneﬁts and costs of airport operations [4]. The airline industry,
in particular, is characterized by a ﬂuctuating demand that is diﬃcult to
foresee. Thus, the beneﬁts of airport operations in terms of the airlines’
willingness to pay for slots are diﬃcult to predict. The same holds for the
social costs of airport operations. Although the airports’ cost for operation
and maintenance as well as the airlines’ congestion costs can be estimated
fairly well, the measurement of the passengers’ and the environmental costs
of congestion is problematic. For these reasons a regulator has to deal with
considerable uncertainty regarding the social beneﬁts and costs of airport
operations.
Resource management under uncertainty was extensively analyzed in
the ﬁeld of environmental economics. For instance, Weitzman [8], refer-
ring to pollution management (amongst others), showed that under uncer-
tainty about beneﬁts and costs of pollution the expected welfare depends on
the choice between prices (e.g., pollution taxes) or quantities (e.g., emission
standards) as instruments. His analysis is based on the assumption that
the amount of uncertainty is suﬃciently small to justify a second order ap-
proximation of beneﬁt and cost functions in the relevant range. In contrast,
Adar and Griﬃn [1] directly focus on linear marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost functions where uncertainty is modelled as producing parallel shifts of
these functions. They demonstrate that optimal choice of instruments de-
pends on the relative slopes of the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost
function, which is equivalent to the result indicated by Weitzman [7]. Prices
as instruments generate a higher expected social welfare than quantities as
instruments if the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function is higher than that
of the marginal cost function in absolute values et vice versa. The result
3will reappear as a special case of our own model. Note that the result also
holds for uncertain social costs as long as the beneﬁt and cost functions are
not stochastically correlated [6], [7], [8]. Stavins [7] additionally ﬁnds that
positive correlation of beneﬁts and costs favors quantities as instruments. In
a general equilibrium setting Kelly [5] also provides theoretical support for a
quantity based regulation.
However, these results are of limited use for the management of airport fa-
cilities like runway capacities. The reason is that the demand for the runway
capacities of diﬀerent airports is interdependent, i.e. slot usage at one airport
aﬀects slot demand at other airports. In principle, two types of interdepen-
dencies exist: substitutability due to airport competition or complementarity.
Airports might compete for passengers or air cargo if they are closely located
to each other. Another source for airport competition is the hub-and-spoke
networks of airlines, because hub-airports can compete for transfer passen-
gers. With competition an increase of runway usage at one airport decreases
the demand for runway usage at other airports. However, due to the network
character of the industry, airports normally provide complementary services
because ﬂights connect diﬀerent airports. Thus, an increase of slot usage at
one airport raises slot demand at other airports. In this paper we focus on the
second eﬀect which we shall call demand complementarity in the following.
The contribution of this paper is to model and analyze the welfare eﬀects
of slot constraints and congestion pricing under uncertainty and demand
complementarity. We show that this changes the standard results provided
by Weitzman [8] and Adar and Griﬃn [1]. The diﬀerence in expected social
welfare generated by congestion pricing or, respectively, slot constraints still
depends on the relative slopes of the marginal beneﬁt and marginal social cost
function. However, the level of demand complementarity also plays an im-
4portant role. We show that slot constraints become more favorable compared
to congestion pricing if demand complementarities are taken into account.
Under congestion pricing the price for take oﬀ and landing operations is ﬁxed
but not the number of operations, as under slot constraints. Therefore, due to
the demand uncertainty, under congestion pricing the amount of take oﬀ and
landing operations is also uncertain. Moreover, the demand complementarity
for airport facilities reinforces the eﬀect of demand uncertainty on runway
usage. If demand at one airport is higher than expected it also increases
the demand for other airports, due to the demand complementarity, which
in turn increases demand for the former airport and so forth. For this rea-
son, if demand complementarity plays an important role, the expected social
welfare under congestion pricing decreases compared to slot constraints.
The analysis of socially optimal regulation is complemented by an inves-
tigation of monopolistic airport behavior. Proﬁt maximizing monopolistic
airports can be expected to raise take oﬀ and landing fees above the eﬃcient
level. However, at overloaded airports, price increases constitute an adequate
measure to reduce congestion and improve eﬃciency. Therefore, one might
ask whether monopolistic airport pricing can compensate for the negative ef-
fects arising from external congestion costs. In order to analyze the need to
regulate congested airports we will therefore analyze the behavior of monop-
olistic airports under uncertainty and demand complementarity. We show
that in a non-cooperative game airports always choose prices as instruments.
Hence, they fail to choose quantities as instruments when this is socially op-
timal. Moreover, given that they correctly choose prices as instruments from
a social planners point of view, monopoly prices turn out to be too high and,
therefore, produce a deadweight loss.
5In the next section we present the model. Section three compares the
eﬀects of slot constraints and congestion pricing on expected social welfare.
Section four analyzes monopolistic airport behavior. Finally, in section ﬁve
we conclude.
2 The model
We consider two monopolistic airports in a regulated area and some outside
airports. Each regulated airport serves perfectly separated catchment areas.
Figure 1 illustrates this case. Passengers are assumed to make only direct
ﬂights (no transfers). Airports 1 and 2 are under the control of a regulator
or, respectively, a social planner. The other airports are not. For instance,
suppose that they belong to a diﬀerent jurisdiction. Airports 1 and 2 are
assumed to be symmetric with regard to cost and demand conditions.
Airport usage at each airport is denoted by qi ¸ 0 with i 2 f1;2g. Air-
lines connecting airports 1 and 2 need to use airport facilities at both airports
and will serve customers at both airports. We capture this demand comple-
mentarity by introducing a parameter ® in the airlines’ inverse demand for
runway capacity at airport i:
Pi(q1;q2) = ®qj + a ¡ bqi + ei (1)
with i 6= j, a;b > 0, and b > ® ¸ 0. By equation (1) the demand for
runway facilities depends on runway usage at the other airport. An increase
of the runway usage at one airport induces a parallel shift of the inverse
demand curve of the other airport. As a consequence, for given prices an
increase of slots demanded at airport j raises the demand for slots of airport
i. The intensity of this eﬀect depends on ®. Since, by assumption, airports
1 and 2 do not compete, ® is non-negative. Furthermore, airport demand is




Figure 1: Two airports in a regulated area with perfectly sepa-
rated catchments.
7determined by a stochastic term ei for i 2 1;2 that also generates parallel
shifts of the demand curve. Demand shocks e1 and e2 are supposed to be
independent, with expectation value zero and variance ¾2
p > 0.
Solving simultaneously the two equations given by (1) generates the de-
mand function for slots at airport i:
qi(p1;p2) :=
ab + a® ¡ bpi ¡ ®pj + bei + ®ej
b2 ¡ ®2 : (2)
Assuming that airlines are in perfect competition, the inverse demand func-
tion depicts the marginal beneﬁts of passengers from slot usage minus the
marginal costs of airlines. The former accounts for the private congestion
costs of passengers and the latter for the private congestion costs of airlines.











The integrability condition is satisﬁed since, in a partial economic context,
there are no income eﬀects [3]. This implies that the solution of the line
integral is independent of the particular path along which integration is taken.















2) + e1 q1 + e2 q2:
The variable airport costs of runway usage by airlines are supposed to be






8with c > 0 and a stochastic term ec with expectation value one and a variance
¾2
c > 0 which determine the slope of the marginal external congestion costs
curve. Demand shocks and external congestion costs shocks are supposed
to be independent. In contrast, costs shocks are perfectly correlated for
airports 1 and 2. Brueckner [2] found that external social cost depends on
the airlines’ market share at airports. However, since airlines are assumed to
be in perfect competition, each airline’s market share is negligible. Therefore,
external social costs are independent of the identity of airlines. Welfare W
generated by airport usage in the regulated area is determined by











2) + e1 q1 + e2 q2:
3 Welfare optimal congestion control
To control congestion, two diﬀerent policy measures are usually under discus-
sion: slot constraints and congestion pricing. With slot constraints airlines
need to have take-oﬀ or landing permissions (slots) to incorporate the regu-
lated airport into their networks. Currently the allocation of slots is based on
grandfather rights which do not guarantee an eﬃcient allocation because they
do not account for the willingness to pay for slots. However, in the following
we assume that slots are eﬃciently allocated (say, by an auction). The other
instrument, congestion pricing, internalizes external congestion costs by a
price premium and, thus, eﬀectively reduces slot demand and congestion.
To compare the eﬀects of slot constraints and congestion pricing on ex-
pected social welfare we calculate the optimal slot constraints (^ q1; ^ q2) :=
argmaxq1;q2 E[W(q1;q2)] were E[:] is the expected value operator. Due to
9the symmetry of airports we can denote the optimal slot constraint for each
airport by ^ q. Straightforward calculations show that:
^ q =
a
b + c ¡ ®
:
Observe that ^ q is increasing in ®. Therefore, with demand complementarity
the optimal slot constraint is higher compared to the case without comple-
mentarity. This is due to the fact that an increased runway usage at one
airport increases the beneﬁts of using the runway of the other airport. The
resulting expected social welfare is
E[W(^ q; ^ q)] =
a
2
b + c ¡ ®
: (3)
Note that E[W(^ q; ^ q)] > 0 always holds. Hence, the expected welfare under
slot constraints is always positive in optimum.
On the other hand, for optimal congestion prices it holds (^ p1; ^ p2) :=
argmaxp1;p2 E[W(q1;q2)] s.t. qi = Di(p1;p2) for i 2 f1;2g. Due to the sym-
metry of airports, we can denote the optimal congestion price for each airport
by ^ p. Straightforward calculations give
^ p =
ac
b + c ¡ ®
: (4)
The optimal expected slot price is also increasing in ®. The reason is that
passenger beneﬁts increase if ® increases and, hence, prices also have to
increase to bring congestion to the optimal level. The expected social welfare
with congestion pricing is
E[W(^ p1; ^ p2)] =
a
2
b + c ¡ ®
+
(b3 ¡ b2 c ¡ b®2 ¡ c®2) ¾2
p
(b ¡ ®)
2 (b + ®)
2 : (5)
Observe that E[W(^ p1; ^ p2)] can become negative if c is high enough.
10Proposition 1 Congestion pricing leads to higher expected welfare compared




2 maxfb ¡ c;0g
b + c
: (6)
Proof Comparison of equations (5) and (3) gives
E[W(^ p1; ^ p2)] ¡ E[W(^ q1; ^ q2)] =
(b3 ¡ b2 c ¡ b®2 ¡ c®2) ¾2
p
(b ¡ ®)
2 (b + ®)
2 : (7)
It directly follows that E[W(^ p1; ^ p2)]¡E[W(^ q1; ^ q2)] ¸ 0 if and only if condition
(6) holds. ¥
Condition (7) shows that uncertainty about external congestion costs is
not relevant for instrument choice which is in line with the ﬁndings from
Weitzman [8]. The reason is that uncertainty about costs does not aﬀect the
airports’ behavior.
To explain the intuition behind condition (6) we begin with assuming
that ® = 0 holds, i.e. we assume that demand complementarity does not
exist. Then this condition is equivalent to c · b. Hence, without demand
complementarity expected welfare with congestion pricing is higher compared
to the expected welfare with slot constraints if and only if c · b is satisﬁed.
This is equivalent to the standard result shown by Weitzman [8] and Adar
and Griﬃn [1]. Figure 2 illustrates two cases where c > b or, respectively,
c < b holds. Suppose that demand is higher than expected, i.e. ei > 0 realizes.
Because demand was underestimated with congestion pricing prices are too
low and airport usage is too high compared to the welfare optimum. The
resulting welfare loss is of size B. On the other hand, with slot constraints
the number of slots is too low, prices are too high, and the resulting welfare
loss is of size A. Figure 2a demonstrates that A < B if c > b holds. On the
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Figure 2: Slot constraints vs. congestion pricing without demand
complementarity.
the two areas denoted by A and B are of the same size so that instruments
perform equally well. These relations also hold for the case that demand is
lower than expected.
Now assume that complementarities exist, i.e. ® > 0 holds. Condition (6)
shows that congestion pricing only reaches a higher expected welfare com-
pared to slot constraints if demand complementarity stays below a critical
level. In other words, the diﬀerence between b and c must be strictly posi-
tive. Therefore, in contrast to the standard result, with b = c slot constraints























a) Airport 1 b) Airport 2
4/3
Figure 3: Slot constraints vs. congestion pricing with demand
complementarity. Parameters: a = b = c = 1, e1 = 0:5, e2 = 0,
ec = 1, and ® = 0:5.
that under congestion pricing airport usage is uncertain and demand comple-
mentarity propagates demand uncertainty of one airport to the other. As a
consequence, under demand complementarity slot constraints gradually be-
come more favorable compared to congestion pricing from a social planners
point of view.
The following example with a = b = c = 1 and ® = 0:5 demonstrates. For
congestion pricing and slot constraints ^ p = ^ q = 2=3 holds. Suppose prices
are chosen as instruments and demand shocks e1 = 0:5 and e2 = 0 and costs
13shock ec = 1 realize. The resulting equilibrium quantities are q1 = 4=3 and
q2 = 1. Figure 3a shows the corresponding inverse demand curve P1(q1;1)
and the quantity q1 = 4=3 implied by ^ p of airport 1 and 2. The inverse
demand of airport 2 when airport 1 chooses slot constraints as instruments
with q1 = ^ q = 2=3 is given by P2(2=3;q2) in ﬁgure 3b. This ﬁgure also
shows q2 = 1 at airport 2. Now the change in beneﬁts arising from a shift
of the regulatory regime from congestion pricing to slot constraints can be
calculated in the following way:















= ¡(A + C) ¡ E:
On the other hand, the change in external congestion cost is equal to
C(^ q; ^ q) ¡ C(q1(^ p; ^ p);q2(^ p; ^ p)) =
2 X
i=1
(Ci(^ q) ¡ Ci(qi(^ p; ^ p)))
= ¡(B + C) ¡ (D + E):
Hence, the change in welfare generated by the shift of the regulatory regime
is
W(^ q; ^ q) ¡ W(q1(^ p; ^ p);q2(^ p; ^ p)) = ¡A + B + D = D = 1=9 > 0:
The shift of the regulatory regime from congestion pricing to slot constraints
increases welfare by ¡A+B+D (see ﬁgure 3a and 3b). However, from b = c
it follows that A = B holds. Therefore, the overall welfare increase is given
by D = 1=9. Note that the size of D, at airport 2, depends on the shift of
the inverse demand due to the change of runway usage at airport 1. This in
turn depends on ®. Hence, this is where complementarity comes into play.
14Note that this does not imply that, due to the regime shift, welfare at
airport 2 increases while welfare at airport 1 remains unaﬀected. Changing
the particular path along which integration is taken would change the pic-
ture. Therefore, with complementarities it is not possible to split the overall
increase in welfare from a regime shift between the two airports.
4 Monopolistic behavior
Due to the demand complementarity decisions on prices or slot constraints
of one airport aﬀect the performance of the other airport although airports
are considered to be monopolies. In order to analyze the eﬀect of demand
complementarity on proﬁt maximizing airports we model the interaction be-
tween airport one and two as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the airports
simultaneously decide between slot constraints or pricing as instruments to
allocate runway capacity. In this stage, it is possible that airports choose
the same or diﬀerent instruments. In the second stage airports individually
and simultaneously decide on their own, speciﬁc slot constraint respectively
pricing level. Finally, the costs shock and the demand shocks realize. We
solve this game by backward induction.
Assume that both airports choose slot constraints as instruments (regime
Q). Airport proﬁt in quantities is ¦i(q1;q2) := qiPi(q1;q2). The correspond-
ing reaction function qr







for i 2 f1;2g. Solving simultaneously the two equations given by (8) gener-


















Now assume that both airports choose prices as instruments (regime P).
Then, the reaction function pr
i(pj) := argmaxpi E[¦i(p1;p2)] with ¦i(p1;p2) :=




ab + a® ¡ ®pj
2b
(10)




a (b + ®)
2b + ®
: (11)






a2 b (b + ®)
(b ¡ ®) (2b + ®)
2: (12)
Finally, assume that airport i chooses prices and airport j slot constraints
with i 6= j (regime PQ). Then i maximizes E[¦i(pi;qj)] by choice of pi, where
E[¦i(pi;qj)] := E[piqi(pi;qj)] = pi
a + qj ® ¡ pi
b
:
The expression for qi(pi;qj) follows directly from (1). Denote the reaction
function of airport i by pr





a + qj ®
2
: (13)
On the other hand, airport j maximizes E[¦j(pi;qj)] by choice of qj, where
E[¦j(pi;qj)] := E[qjPj(pi;qj)] = qj
(b + ®) (a + (® ¡ b) qj) ¡ ®pi
b
:
16Rearrangement of equation (2) gives Pj(pi;qj). The reaction function of j,
qr




ab + a® ¡ ®pi
2b2 ¡ 2®2 : (14)
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Lemma 1 For each monopolistic airport, prices as instruments is a strictly
dominant strategy in stage 1 of the game if ® > 0. In particular, in the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium airports choose prices as instruments.









if and only if ® > 0. Furthermore, from (15) and (12) it follows that
¦i(pP
i ;pP




j ) if and only if ® > 0. Hence, no matter what
the other airport does, it is always better to use prices as instruments. This
shows that the choice of prices as instruments is a strictly dominant strategy
in stage one of the game. It directly follows that in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium airports choose prices as instruments. ¥
Lemma 2 Airports set pP
i > ^ p if condition (6) holds.
Proof One shows that pP
i > ^ p if and only if ® <
p







b(b ¡ c) (16)
it follows that condition (6) implies pP
i > ^ p. ¥
17Proposition 2 Monopolistic airports produce a suboptimally low expected
social welfare if ® > 0 is satisﬁed.
Proof Necessary conditions for monopolistic airports to optimize expected
social welfare are, ﬁrst, to choose the optimal instruments in stage 1, and,
second, to choose the optimal price or slot constraint, respectively. Due to
lemma 1 in the subgame perfect equilibrium airports always choose prices as
instruments if ® > 0 is satisﬁed. By proposition 1, prices as instruments opti-
mize expected social welfare if and only if condition (6) is fulﬁlled. However,
due to lemma 2 prices of monopolistic airports do not maximize expected
social welfare because they are too high in equilibrium. ¥
Proposition 2 indicates that airports should be regulated for any ® >
0. The reason is, ﬁrst, that monopolistic airports do not switch to slot
constraints when they should. Second, even if they correctly choose prices
as instruments, equilibrium prices are too high from a social point of view.
Only in one speciﬁc case would monopolists take their instruments right.























Proposition 3 Monopolistic airports maximize expected social welfare if and
only if ® = 0 and b = c.
Proof If and only if ® = 0 the expected proﬁts of monopolistic airports
are identical for both instruments (see (17)). It follows from inequality (6)
that in optimum the expected social welfare is identical no matter which
instruments are chosen if ® = 0 and b = c holds. Furthermore, pP
i = p
PQ























Figure 4: Expected monopoly proﬁts under prices as instruments
and slot constraints with a = b = 1 and ® = 0:5.
For the general case, ® > 0, ﬁgure 4 illustrates why airports are in favor of
prices as instruments compared to slot constraints. Suppose that a = b = 1
and ® = 0:5. Additionally, assume that both airports choose slot constraints
as instruments. The equilibrium number of slots is given by q
Q
i = 2=3 for
both airports, and the expected proﬁt of each airport under slot constraints
is equal to the sum of A and B. Now assume that both airports choose prices
as instruments. In equilibrium pP
i = 3=5 for both airports. In this case the
expected proﬁt of each airport is equal to the sum of B and C. Comparison
of A and C shows that expected proﬁts are higher under congestion pricing
than under slot constraints. The reason is that under congestion pricing
demand is more elastic because airport usage is not ﬁxed and changes of
demand are reinforced by demand complementarity. Moreover, the reason
why the choice of the instruments can be diverse from the airports’ and a
19social planner’s point of view is that airports do not take external congestion
costs into account.
5 Conclusions
To control airport congestion two diﬀerent policy options are normally un-
der discussion: slot constraints and congestion pricing. The former requires
airlines to buy slots for the operation of ﬂights at congested airports. The
latter reduces the demand for take oﬀ and landing operations of airlines by
rising airport fees. Under perfect information about the social beneﬁts and
costs of slot usage both instruments can reach optimal welfare results. In
contrast, under uncertainty about the social beneﬁts of slot usage the choice
of instrument normally aﬀects the expected level of social welfare.
Due to the network character of the airline industry, the demand for slots
of monopolistic airports is complementary. As a consequence, the advanta-
geousness of congestion pricing and slot constraints depends on the slope of
the inverse demand and marginal congestion cost function and on the level
of demand complementarity between airport services. In particular, we show
that demand complementarity increases the expected social welfare under
slot constraints compared to congestion pricing. The reason is that under
congestion pricing demand uncertainty translates into uncertainty with re-
gard to airport usage. Furthermore, demand complementarity for airport
services reinforces the eﬀect of demand uncertainty on airport usage and, as
a consequence, reduces expected social welfare under congestion pricing.
Turning to the behavior of monopolistic airports we also showed that
they fail to optimize expected social welfare. The interaction between air-
ports is modelled as a two-stage game in which, ﬁrst, the airports choose
20prices or slot constraints as instruments, and, second, they choose prices or
slot constraints, respectively. In stage one of the game prices as instruments
is a dominant airport strategy. Therefore, in the subgame perfect equilib-
rium airports always choose prices as instruments. Since prices only have
the potential to optimize expected social welfare if the level of demand com-
plementarity is low enough, this is a ﬁrst source of market failure. A second
source of market failure is that monopolistic airport prices are too high, if
prices are the correct instruments from a social point of view. These results
indicate a need for the regulation of monopolistic airports which is not only
based on the eﬀects of monopolistic market power and external congestion
costs, but also arises from the network character of the air transport industry,
namely demand complementarity.
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